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Joint into the common task, an international team of authors gathered in 
this editor’s volume, offers what the title says – different perspectives on the 
Self . Edited by Boran Berčić, this volume attempts to clarify the vague notion 
of human’s personal identity and the issues it raises in different branches of 
philosophy . Thematically divided into six parts, the volume consists of seven-
teen original articles accompanied by a comprehensive editor’s overview that 
serves as an introduction . Given that the articles address a range of different 
questions about the Self and related matters, I find this overview very helpful 
for the readers who aim to target a specific issue .
The first, and in my opinion, philosophically most interesting part is 
entitled “Self and Body” . This chapter consists of three articles that, each 
in its own way, target contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science on embodied nature of cognition . The Chapter starts with 
Eric T . olson’s article, “The Central Dogma of Transhumanism”, in which he 
argues that the self is exclusively material, “made up entirely out of matter”(p . 
45) . The full range of all human capacities (perceptual, cognitive and motor) 
depends entirely upon features of the physical material thing humans are 
– biological organisms . on this ground, olson notoriously rejects the cen-
tral dogma of transhumanism (CDT) according to which humans can upload 
themselves into computers and continue their existence as inorganic beings . 
The CDT presupposes three contentious claims: (1) there can be genuine 
artificial intelligence, (2) we could become computer people, (3) technology 
can advance to the point where uploading will be possible . olson especially 
outlines two problems for the second presupposition: the branching problem 
(uploading ourselves into several computers and continuing our existence as 
several persons) and the duplicate problem (blurring the difference between 
uploaded person and newly created computer person) . In concluding remarks 
of the paper, olson, even though rejects them as metaphysically incorrect, ex-
amines the option that transhumanist views might be good enough for prac-
tical purposes . However, he concludes with a reasonable statement: “it looks 
doubtful whether computer people could have what matters to us in identity: 
whether having psychological duplicates in computer would be just as good 
for us, practically speaking, as literally moving there ourselves” (p . 56) . The 
following article of the first chapter follows the issue of embodied cognition . 
Contrary to olson, who claims that humans are material entities, Miljana 
Milojević in “Embodied and Extended Self ” argues that the self is nothing 
more than a set of various functions . She supports her argument with a well-
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known example of otto who has alzheimer’s and cannot remember anything 
without his notebook . Milojević argues that otto’s notebook is literary a part 
of him, while stressing the importance of rethinking the boundaries of the 
physical realization of the self . In answering what make us “exist as single 
thinking, perceiving and acting entities persisting through time” (p . 78), she 
combines different philosophical traditions and concludes that humans are 
embodied but can extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism . 
The question of what makes the personal identity of individual biological 
organism is presented in the third article, “The Immunological Self ” . In this 
paper, Zdenka Brzović tries to find an adequate candidate for a theory of or-
ganism’s identity . after the brief overview of various immunological theories 
of identity, and a special emphasis on the self-nonself theory in immunology, 
Brzović concludes that none of the listed theory is satisfactory as they already 
presuppose the existence of the organism’s identity .
The second part of the volume entitled “Self-knowledge” can best be 
described with an ancient Greek motto: “Know thyself!” . The chapter con-
sists of Nenad Miščević’s article “The Value of Self- Knowledge” and Luca 
Malatesti’s “The Self-ascription of Conscious Experience” . Miščević in his 
article analyzes two kinds of self-knowledge, both characterized in terms of 
a virtue-epistemological framework: (1) knowledge of inner phenomenal states 
(knowledge that I feel pain in my back) and (2) knowledge of one’s causal 
and dispositional properties (knowledge that I am a gourmet) . With optimistic 
view on the value of the self-knowledge and self-inquisitiveness, Miščević 
calls upon the injunction “Know thyself!” as an advice that is still valuable . 
Luca Malatesti in “The Self-ascription of Conscious Experience” comple-
ments Mišćević’s paper with the aspiration to give an answer to the question: 
How do we ascribe the experience (that I have pain in my back) to ourselves? Re-
jecting traditional theories within philosophy of mind (behaviorism, physi-
calism and functionalism), Malatesti follows alan Miller and concludes that 
self-ascription “involves the capacity to think about ourselves as entities that 
have sense organs and internal mental states that are determined by interac-
tion with certain sorts of stimulation of these sense organs” (p . 135) .
although it is somewhere suggested that the concern with the self is 
the product of modern philosophy starting with Descartes1,14the third part 
entitled “Self in the history of philosophy” proves the opposite . This chapter 
gathers articles that analyze the nature of the self in different philosophi-
cal traditions and periods: Boran Berčić in “The Logical Positivists on the 
Self ” examines what logical positivists (Schlick, Carnap, ayer, Weinberg, 
and Reichenbach) thought about the self with special emphasis on Descartes’ 
1 Klaus Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self ”, History 
of the Modern Sciences, 18(4), 2005, 27–48 .
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Cogito; Ljudevit Hanžek in “Brentano on Self-Consciousness” critically ana-
lyzes Franz Brentano’s view that all our mental states have a quality of inner 
consciousness, and the arguments of contemporary authors keen to Bren-
tano’s view about self-consciousness; Goran Kardaš in “The No-Self View in 
Buddhist Philosophy” presents an interesting overview of Buddhist’s No-Self 
View and examines its validity; ana Gavran Miloš in “The Self in ancient 
Philosophy” wonders if the notion of self (i .e . subjectivity and first-person 
perspective) existed in the philosophical thought of ancients .
The following, fourth part of the volume switches back into contem-
porary debates on the self and aims to answer questions concerning personal 
identity and the nature of agency . The latter presents an important issue in 
philosophy of mind, ethics, the debates on (moral) reasons, and the debates 
on free will . all these are intertwined in the following three articles . Matej 
Sušnik in “Ideal Self in Non-Ideal Circumstances” questions the impact the 
ideal self has on the actual, real self in moral deliberation process . Sušnik 
positions himself with Bernard William’s internalism about reasons accord-
ing to which “an agent has a reason to perform some action only if he could 
become motivated to perform that action through the process of reasoning” 
(p . 224) . This view, Sušnik continues, brings to the surface the importance of 
the process of idealization . It is through this process that we learn something 
about ourselves (e .g . what is the best way to proceed in given circumstances), 
but also it is the process through which we can “step into someone’s shoes” 
and learn about other people’s reasons and motivations they have in the proc-
ess of decision making . The decision making process and the issue of agency 
in context of the debate on free will are problems Filip čeč discusses in “The 
Disappearing agent”, while Marko Jurjako in “agency and Reductionism 
about the Self ” evaluates the compatibility of Parfit’s psychological criterion 
of personal identity and the agency based account of the self .
Fifth part of the editor’s volume is dedicated to the theme that is not 
common among debates on the self – the nonexistence of the self . In “on 
Never Been Born” Marin Biondić examines the possibility of talking about 
the people who have never existed and those who do not yet exist . In “Fic-
tional Characters” Iris Vidmar examines whether there is such a thing as a 
rigid personal identity of fictional characters .
In the last part of the volume, entitled “Metaphysics & Philosophy of 
Language”, authors explore timeless questions of self-identification . Marta 
ujvari in “Haecceity Today and with Duns Scotus” analyzes haecceity, the 
concept that contemporary metaphysics uses “to secure the transworld iden-
tity of concrete individuals in non-qualitative terms” (p . 331) . In “Who am 
I?” arto Mutanen wonders what counts as a valid answer to the question 
expressed in the title, while Takashi Yagisawa in “Meta-Representational Me” 
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questions the role first person singular me has in philosophy of language and 
philosophy in general .
It is impossible to do justice to the complexity of each paper of the vol-
ume, but I think it suffices to say that they are of good quality and invariably 
interesting . as mentioned, the volume assembles innovative positions and 
perspectives, but, in my opinion, it is not comprehensive enough to be useful 
without additional readings . overall, this editor’s volume is a thought-pro-
voking resource of original ideas and new arguments that will, undoubtedly, 
advance the understanding of complexity of the self and the implications it 
has on the debates as conducted in different branches of philosophy .
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